Alayna J. Culbertson, J. Blaine Johnson, Eva C. Johnson, and Diane PEarl Meibos v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, Commissioner Randy Horiuchi, and Commissioner Brent Oversen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Alayna J. Culbertson, J. Blaine Johnson, Eva C.
Johnson, and Diane PEarl Meibos v. Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
Commissioner Randy Horiuchi, and
Commissioner Brent Oversen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas R. Short; Salt Lake County Attorney; Patrick F. Holden; Deputy County Attorney; Jay D.
Gurmankin;Chris R Hogle; Bermn, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage; Attorney for Commissioners
Overson and Horiuchi.
Diane Peral Meibos; Pro Se; Walter F. Bugden; Bugden, Collins and Morton.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, No. 960212 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/147
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. 
BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA C. 
JOHNSON and DIANE PEARL 
MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO <3 (P nZ( 7 - m 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT OVERSON, 
individually, 
Case No. 960212CA 
Priority No. 14 
D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l l e e s . 
A p p e a l f r o m t h e O r d e r o f t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
E n t e r e d A p r i l 1 4 , 1 9 9 5 
The H o n o r a b l e G l e n n K. I w a s a k i , P r e s i d i n g 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Douglas R. Short 
S a l t Lake County At torney 
P a t r i c k F. Holden 
Deputy County At torney 
2001 South S t a t e S t r e e t , #S3400 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84190-1200 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Chr is R. Hogle 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1250 
Attorney for Commissioners 
Overson and Horiuchi 
Diane Pearl Meibos 
Pro Se 
3278 Marjon Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84092-4212 
Walter F. Bugden 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON 
4021 South 700 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Appellants 
FILED 
FEB 1 h 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. 
BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA C. 
JOHNSON and DIANE PEARL 
MEIBOS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
v. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, COMMISSIONER 
RANDY HORIUCHI and 
COMMISSIONER BRENT OVERSON, 
individually, 
Case No. 960212CA 
Priority No. 14 
D e f e n d a n t s / A p p e l l e e s . 
Appea l from t h e O r d e r of t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Cour t 
E n t e r e d A p r i l 14 , 1995 
The H o n o r a b l e Glenn K. I w a s a k i , P r e s i d i n g 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Douglas R. Short 
S a l t Lake County Attorney-
P a t r i c k F. Holden 
Deputy County At torney 
2001 South S t a t e S t r e e t , #S3400 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84190-1200 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Chris R. Hogle 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1250 
Attorney for Commissioners 
Overson and Horiuchi 
Diane Pearl Meibos 
Pro Se 
3278 Marjon Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84092-4212 
Walter F. Bugden 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON 
4021 South 700 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities iii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 1 
Determinative Constitutional provisions or statutes . . . 3 
Statement of the Case 3 
Nature of the Case 3 
Course of Proceedings 4 
Disposition in the trial court 10 
Statement of Facts 8 
Summary of Argument 15 
Argument 16 
POINT I 
THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION BECAUSE CULBERTSON 
DID NOT FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL 16 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
CLAIMS RELATING TO THE VACATION 
ORDINANCE BASED ON THE IN COURT 
WAIVER, ABANDONMENT AND/OR ACQUIESCENCE 
OF THE ROAD VACATION CLAIMS BY 
CULBERTSON7 S ATTORNEY 25 
i 
POINT III 
THE BOARD DID PROPERLY AND TIMELY 
PLEAD BOTH WAIVER AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 32 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLEGED FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH RULE 52 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS NOT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 34 
POINT V 
THE ORDER CAN BE UPHELD UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF INVITED ERROR 3 6 
POINT VI 
CULBERTSON'S CHALLENGE TO THE 
VACATION ORDINANCE ARE NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE COURT 37 
Conclusion 42 
Addendum 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Case Law 
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 95 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 27 
Baker v. Angus. 910 P.2d 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . . . . 1 
Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . . . 27 
Butler Crockett v. Pinecrest Pipeline. 
909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995) 36 
Cache County v. Property Tax Division. 
296 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah 1996) 39 
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration. 909 P.2d 271 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) 31 
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Med. Center. 
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990) 2 
DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co.. 
828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 20,23,25 
John Deere Co. v. H Equipment. Inc.. 
876 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 26, 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 
575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978) 39 
Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co.. 
137 P.2d 347 (Utah 1943) 36 
Masters v. Woosley. 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . 3 
Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . . 35, 
Morgan v. Morgan. 875 P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . . . 20,2 
iii 
Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991) . . 20 
Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . .41 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) .17 
Ong International v. 11th Avenue Corp.. 
850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993) 36 
Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . 24 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 
844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 35 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) 37 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State ex rel. Wright v. Park City School District, 
133 P. 128 (1913) 40 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 
(Utah 1982) 38 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 
767 P. 2d 569 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 17 
Zions First Nat. Bank v. C'est Bon Venture. 
613 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980) 19,20 
Federal Case Law 
In Re Cargill. Inc.. 66 F.3d 1256 (1st Cir. 1995) 26 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 3,17,18,22 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 38 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 25 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504 23,24,25 
iv 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 3,16,18,20,23,25,34 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-808 (1995) 41,42 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-809 (1995) 41,42 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17 -27-810 (1995) . . . . 37,39,40 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-1001 (1995) 32,33 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-51-32 (1996) 26 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-15-1 (1995) 42 
Treatises 
1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction 39 
v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Board contests that this Court has jurisdiction because 
Appellants failed to file a timely notice of appeal. However, if 
this Court has has jurisdiction over this appeal it is pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j), not Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(i) as stated in Culbertson's statement of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Did Culbertson's failure to file a notice of appeal 
within thirty days from the April 14, 1995 final Order preclude 
this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this 
appeal? 
Standard of Review: This issue is raised for the first time 
on appeal because it involves a question solely of the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals to hear this appeal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals denied a prior motion for summary 
disposition on this issue "because one of the issues has been 
deferred pending plenary consideration of the case . . ." Order, 
October 17, 1996; Judge Pamela T. Greenwood. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and a 
correction of error standard is utilized. Baker v. Angus. 910 
P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
B. Did the trial court err in dismissing all claims 
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relating to the vacation ordinance based on Culbertson's 
attorney's in court waiver, abandonment and/or acquiescence of 
their challenge to the vacation ordinance? 
Standard of Review for Summary Judgment: "Because summary 
judgment is a conclusion of law, we give no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law but review those conclusions for 
correctness." Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Med. Center, 791 
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990) . However, the standard of review for 
questions of waiver is different. In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 938 (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court stated that "waiver 
is a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot 
profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot hope to 
work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such 
decisions." Further, vx[t]he judge of that court is therefore 
considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility 
of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a whole, 
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold 
record." Id. at 936. Therefore, a measure of discretion should 
be afforded the trial court's order based on waiver. 
This issue was presented to the trial court in the Board's 
answer to the second amended complaint and memorandum in support 
of its motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative 
2 
for summary judgment. (R. 320; 340; 343). 
C. Can the trial court's order be sustained under the 
doctrine of invited error? 
Standard of review: Because the doctrine of invited error 
can only be raised on appeal, there is no applicable standard of 
review. The Board believes the application of the doctrine in 
the instant case is a matter of law. 
D. Does Culbertson7s failure to present arguments attacking 
the validity of the vacation ordinance to the trial court by 
motion or otherwise preclude appellate consideration of her 
arguments? 
Standard of review: Because the failure to raise or properly 
present issues to the trial court will be raised first on appeal, 
there is no applicable standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Copies of the above-cited law are attached as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the dismissal of certain claims in an 
amended complaint brought by Appellants Alayna J. Culbertson, J. 
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Blaine Johnson, Eva C. Johnson and Diane Pearl Meibos 
(hereinafter individually and collectively referred to as 
"Culbertson") against the Board of County Commissioners and 
individually named commissioners arising out of the partial 
vacation and closure of an adjacent roadway. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On June 20, 1994 Culbertson filed a verified complaint 
against the Board of County Commissioners seeking to enjoin the 
vacation of North Union Boulevard. (R. 1-20). Culbertson also 
filed an Order to Show Cause (R. 29) and a memorandum in support 
of temporary restraining order. (R. 3 6-43). The Board opposed 
the motion through its memorandum (R. 47-76) and the trial court 
denied Culbertson7s motion for a temporary restraining order. 
(R. 35; 124-126). 
On July 14, 1994 Culbertson filed an amended complaint. (R. 
89-112). The Board of County Commissioners filed an answer to the 
amended complaint on July 27, 1994. (R. 113-120). The parties 
then conducted some discovery out of which arose disputes 
immaterial to this appeal. 
Culbertson next moved for leave to file a second amended 
complaint on November 23, 1994. (R. 182-183). The Board 
opposed Culbertson's motion for leave to file an amended 
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complaint. (R. 194-202) . The trial court heard oral arguments on 
Culbertson's motion on January 30, 1995. (R. 818). At the oral 
argument then counsel for Culbertson made the following 
representations to the trial court: 
The reason we are here before you today, your 
Honor, is not to attack the ordinance. While 
the original complaint may have those 
allegations in it, your Honor, it is a mess 
out there. And what we are here today is 
asking the county to enforce its own 
ordinance. If you look at the amended 
complaint, basically paragraph 33 on, you 
will see that we are not attacking --we are 
not attacking that ordinance in the amended 
complaint. 
(R. 840) 
Later at the January 30, 1995 hearing the trial court 
stated: 
I'm going to allow you to amend if you so 
choose . . . But it will only be as to 
injunctive relief -- I guess not injunctive -
- I guess it is injunctive relief you're 
asking me on one hand part of that where a 
suit to force the county to do something, 
i.e. to enforce their own ordinances, right? 
MR. M. OLSEN: Right. 
(R. 842) 
At that point, Mr. Nick J. Colessides, the attorney then 
representing the Board, requested the following clarification 
from the trial court: 
5 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, clarification for 
just one moment. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, as we have viewed 
these, this is sort --we are dealing with a 
moving target. As I see the second amended 
complaint they are going to be filing another 
version of it and wherein, as I understand 
it, they do not seek to invalidate the 
ordinance, am I correct? 
THE COURT: That's what was represented. 
MR. COLESSIDES: And that issue is dead. 
THE COURT: Plus I have told them they would 
amend to not include damages and so only as 
to the injunctive relief as to have the 
county enforce its own ordinance, that will 
be the limitation on the amendments. 
(R. 843) . 
The trial court granted Culbertson7s motion for leave to 
file an amended complaint. (R. 294-295). However, the trial 
court stated from the bench that he would only allow Culbertson 
to seek injunctive relief and not challenge the vacation 
ordinance or seek monetary damages against the Board or 
individually named commissioners. (R. 918-923) 
On February 13, 1995 Culbertson filed a second amended 
complaint which did not comply with the limitations expressly 
pronounced by the trial court and agreed upon by Culbertson7s 
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counsel. (R. 296-311). On February 22, 1995 the Board of County 
Commissioners filed an answer to the second amended complaint. 
(R. 312-323). 
The Board moved for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the 
alternative for summary judgment, on February 27, 1995. (R. 326-
328). The Board submitted a memorandum and affidavit in support 
of its motion. (R. 329-374). On March 1, 1995 Culbertson again 
moved for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 377-378). Culbertson's motion 
was supported by a memorandum, exhibits as well as affidavits. 
(R. 379-437). Culbertson also submitted a memorandum in 
opposition to the Board's motion for summary judgment. (R. 440-
461). The Board submitted its reply memorandum on March 16, 
1996. (R. 597). On March 29, 1995 a hearing was held on the 
Board's motion for summary judgment on Culbertson's motion for an 
injunction. (R. 637). 
The following exchange took place at the March 29, 1995 
hearing with Culbertson's counsel present: 
[THE COURT]. . . I'm going to dismiss this 
matter without prejudice -- without 
prejudice, that is emphasized -- allowing you 
to exhaust whatever means you wish to, your 
administrative remedies, and then have leave, 
if after that time there has been no 
resolution to your satisfaction, through the 
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-- through Mr. Jones, through the board of 
planning -- the Planning Commission, through 
the Board of County Commissioners and the 
Board of Adjustment, then you do have leave, 
without prejudice to refile the matter. 
It is my indication from listening to you, 
Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that 
it is a continuing problem and that there 
will be no waiver of time, and your position 
taken before me today, and I expect no 
contrary position be taken in further 
litigation --
MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the 
exception of the vacation ordinance. 
THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is 
subject to a previous order that I made. 
(R. 921-922) 
In a minute entry dated March 29, 1995 the trial court ruled 
that the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. (R. 637). 
However, the trial court signed and entered a written final 
order, consistent with the trial court's statements from the 
bench, which dismissed with prejudice ''plaintiffs' claims as 
contained within plaintiffs' second amended complaint, relating 
to that certain Salt Lake County Ordinance as passed by the Board 
of County Commissioners . . . dated August 10, 1995 . . ."(R. 
648) . 
The Board's attorney, on April 1, 1995, sent Culbertson's 
attorney the proposed order dismissing claims relating to the 
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vacation ordinance with prejudice and the remaining claims 
without prejudice. (R. 644-645) . On April 10, 1995 Culbertson 
filed an objection to an order and requested a hearing on the 
objection. (R. 639-643). On April 14, 1995 the Board submitted 
a notice of submission of order. (R. 644-646). On April 14, 
1995 the trial court signed and entered the order and no notice 
of appeal was filed until September 27, 1995. (R. 647-649; 703-
708). On April 21, 1995 Culbertson submitted a notice to submit 
and request for oral argument. (R. 650-651). 
On May 18, 1995 the trial court in a minute entry denied 
Culbertson's objections to the order. (R. 652-653). On August 
30, 1995 the trial court in a minute entry directed the Board to 
draft an order denying the objections. (R. 678). On September 
26, 1995 the trial court entered an order denying Culbertson's 
objections. (R. 701-702). Culbertson filed a notice of appeal 
on September 27, 1995. (R. 703-708). 
On August 13, 1996 the Board filed a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals denied that 
portion of the motion relating to Culbertson7s failure to file a 
timely notice of appeal noting that "one of the issues has been 
deferred pending plenary consideration of the case." Order, 
October 17, 1996 signed by Judge Pamela T. Greenwood. 
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C. Disposition in the trial court. 
Culbertson's second amended complaint was dismissed in part 
with prejudice and in part without prejudice. Claims relating to 
the vacation ordinance were dismissed with prejudice, the 
remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the Board disagrees with a number of Culbertson's 
statement of facts, the Board states the facts relevant to this 
appeal as follows: 
1. Culbertson and the other parties are owners of real 
property adjacent to a road named North Union Avenue. (R. 1-2). 
2. On February 15, 1994 Hermes Associates, Ltd. ("Hermes") 
filed a Petition for Street Vacation seeking to vacate North 
Union Avenue. (R. 489). 
3. Hermes filed the petition as owners of land abutting 
North Union Avenue. (R. 489). Fort Union Associates later became 
the owner of the land owned by Hermes. (R. 347). 
4. Fort Union petitioned to vacate the road in order to 
facilitate the expansion of a shopping center. (R. 358-359). 
5. The Board published the required statutory notices of a 
hearing to be held on the proposed road vacation. (R. 347; 352-
353) . 
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6. On May 25, 1994 the Board held a duly noticed public 
hearing on the petition to vacate North Union. (R. 347). 
7. Culbertson's attorney was present and participated in 
the public hearing. (R. 348; 359-362). 
8. The Board voted 2-1 to vacate a portion of North Union 
and close a twenty-five foot section of North Union which was 
directly in front of Culbertson's residence. (R. 347; 362). The 
road was formerly thirty three feet wide in front of Culbertson's 
property. (R. 5). The eight feet in front of Fort Union's 
property was vacated. (R. 157-160). The Board refers the Court 
to page 70 of the record which, in its view, presents the 
clearest map and visual illustration of the action taken by the 
Board. (R. 70). 
9. The Board voted to permanently close, but not vacate, a 
twenty-five foot section of North Union directly abutting the 
Culbertson property. (R. 362). 
10. On July 13, 1994 the Board signed and published the 
vacation ordinance as Ordinance No. 1270. (R. 481-485). 
11. Initially, Hermes planned on giving Culbertson a 
twenty-five foot easement on the west of Culbertson's property to 
provide Culbertson access to her property. (R. Ill). In a 
further effort to accommodate the adjacent landowners the Board 
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decided to make the access to the west of the property a public 
right-of-way rather than a shared private easement. (R. 159). 
12. On August 10, 1994 the Board signed and published a 
corrected version of the vacation ordinance as Ordinance No. 
1275. Ordinance #1275 corrected the legal description contained 
in the prior ordinance, Ordinance #1270. (R. 354-357). 
13. After the trial court dismissed Culbertson's claims in 
this case, on April 15, 1995 Alayna Culbertson and Diane Pearl 
Meibos filed another verified complaint against the Board of 
County Commissioners and Ken Jones, Case No. 950905166 
challenging inter alia the Board's grant of roadway exemptions 
for 1070 East and again seeking to litigate the question of "what 
constitutes reasonable and adequate access to plaintiff's 
property." 
In addition to the Board's statement of facts, many of 
Culbertson's statement of facts are incorrect or incomplete. The 
following statements of Culbertson are sufficiently material and 
incomplete or inaccurate as to warrant a specific response: 
1. Culbertson states in paragraph 8 that the vote closing 
North Union Avenue left no outlet to any other roadway. At all 
times the Board provided Culbertson with access to her property 
from what was formerly North Union Avenue. First, Hermes 
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proposed a shared private easement to the west of Culbertson's 
property to provide access through North Union Avenue. (R. 20). 
Then, to further accommodate Culbertson the Board made the 
roadway a public roadway rather than a shared private easement, 
which Culbertson concedes is now 1070 East. (R. 159; Culbertson 
Brief, page 11). 
2. Statement of Fact #9 argues that Culbertson did not 
receive proper notice of the Board's action. The Board has 
included in the record the notice it gave on the road vacation. 
(R. 352-353) . Culbertson contests whether the notice was proper 
or adequate, however, that argument is not properly before the 
Court as is argued by the Board in its brief. 
3. Statement of Fact #10 and #13 fails to indicate that the 
Board accurately represented the status of the Ordinance stating: 
"The ordinance as proposed when signed and published will vacate 
a portion of a street located in Salt Lake County known as North 
Union Avenue . . ." (R. 49). Thus, the Board clearly and 
unequivocally stated that the ordinance had not yet been signed 
and published and noted that it "will" vacate North Union Avenue. 
4. Statement of Fact #16 is incorrect and contradicts the 
record. Culbertson states that the Board did not plead waiver: 
The Board's answer states (R. 118) "Defendants affirmatively 
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allege that plaintiffs have waived and/or is estopped to maintain 
their claims as asserted in the complaint." Further, Culbertson 
omits any reference to the fact that the Board pled the statute 
of limitations when the limitations period was implicated; in the 
answer to the second amended complaint. (R. 316)("As a further 
affirmative defense defendants assert that plaintiffs7 attack 
upon the passage of the vacation ordinance is time barred, more 
particularly provided for by § 17-27-1001 Utah Code Annotated, 
1991 Replacement.") 
5. Statement of Fact # 18 states the Board held another 
hearing was held on the road vacation on August 10, 1994. No 
citation to the record is provided. The hearing on the road 
vacation was held on May 25, 1995. The subsequently enacted 
ordinances were passed at public meetings. 
6. Statement of Fact #19 argues that the 1070 East does not 
comply with the County's Standards for Roadway Development. This 
is a legal conclusion which the Board disputes, which is not 
relevant to this appeal and which is not properly before the 
Court. 
7. Statement of Fact # 20 alleging Hermes built into the 
public roadway similarly argues points not relevant to this 
appeal and not properly before the Court. 
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8. Culbertson omits pertinent facts relating to her motion 
for leave to file an amended complaint in Statement of Fact #22. 
Specifically, Culbertson does not mention the explicit 
limitations the trial court placed on any subsequent complaint. 
Additionally Culbertson omits any mention that the subsequently 
submitted complaint did not comply with either her own attorney's 
representations or the trial court's specific directives. See 
Board's Brief, Course of Proceedings. 
9. Paragraph #3 0 improperly argues that the trial court did 
not rule on Culbertson's objections prior to signing the final 
April 14, 1995 Order. This is a legal conclusion and not a fact. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
Culbertson's appeal because Culbertson did not file a notice of 
appeal within thirty days after entry of final judgment. The 
objections Culbertson submitted prior to entry of judgment were 
not post-judgment motions and did not toll the thirty day time 
limit for filing a notice of appeal. 
The trial court's Order dismissing all claims relating to 
the road vacation ordinance was properly based on the open court 
waiver, abandonment and/or acquiescence of such claims by 
Culbertson's attorney. Culbertson claims the Board did not raise 
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the affirmative defenses of waiver and statute of limitations. 
However, the record clearly shows that these defenses were in 
fact raised in a timely fashion. 
In the alternative, the order can be sustained under the 
doctrine of invited error. Finally, Culbertson's renewed attacks 
on the vacation ordinance on appeal are improper. Culbertson's 
arguments are either raised for the first time on appeal, or were 
never presented to the trial court by motion for decision. 
Accordingly Culbertson's attacks on the vacation ordinance are 
not properly before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE CULBERTSON 
DID NOT FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
The issue before the Court is whether Culbertson's 
objections submitted prior to the entry of judgment tolled the 
thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal. Culbertson 
argues that her objections were, in reality, a Rule 52 motion 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The record establishes 
that Culbertson submitted an objection, not a post-judgment 
motion, and that therefore she failed to file her notice of claim 
in a timely manner. 
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Utah appellate courts have consistently noted that "we 
cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely appeal." Nielson v. 
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Further, "[w]hen 
a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that "the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within 3 0 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from." Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure recognizes that a judgment or order is not 
final for purposes of appeal if a proper post-judgment motion is 
filed under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part that: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court 
by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make 
additional findings of fact, whether or not 
an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; (3) under 
Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time 
for appeal for all parties shall run from the 
entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. 
The record shows that Culbertson did not file a notice of 
17 
appeal within thirty days of entry of the trial court's final 
Order. Nor did Culbertson submit a proper post-judgment motion 
under Rule 4(b) which would effectively toll the time period in 
which to file a notice of appeal. 
The trial court entered the Order on April 14, 1995. (R. 
647-649). Culbertson filed a notice of appeal on September 27, 
1995, which purported to appeal from the April 14, 1995 Order. 
(R. 706-708) . On April 10, 1995, four days before entry of 
judgment, Culbertson submitted an "Objection to Order." (R. 63 9-
641). On April 14, 1995 the Board submitted a "Notice of 
Submission of Order" which stated in part: "In a letter dated 
April 4, 1995, plaintiffs' counsel advised the undersigned that 
he was unwilling to approve the order as submitted on the basis 
that the 'Court did not dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with 
prejudice7." (R. 644-646). Based on the record before it on 
April 14, 1995, the trial court signed and entered the Order. 
(R. 647-649). 
The April 14, 1995 Order was a final order under Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Culbertson should have 
filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the Order, but 
failed to do so. Having failed to file a timely notice of 
appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the 
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appeal. 
Culbertson has argued that the objection submitted prior to 
the entry of the April 14, 1995 order constitutes a Rule 52(b) 
motion tolling the thirty day time limit. Culbertson relies on 
Zions First Nat, Bank v. C'est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah 
1980) in support of her position. Dictum in Zions states that: 
If a Rule 52(b) motion is made before 
judgment and presents a substantial question, 
and the motion is not disposed of, either 
expressly or by necessary implication, the 
running of the time for taking an appeal is 
suspended under Rule 73 (a) until the court 
disposes of the motion. 
Zions. 613 P.2d at 517. 
Culbertson's reliance on Zions is misplaced. First, the 
Court in Zions found that the disputed judgment was final. The 
Court overturned the trial court's granting of an untimely Rule 
52 motion in part because "the judgment . . . [had] the effect of 
denying the oral motion." Id. at 517. Similarly in the instant 
case, the trial court's ruling after the submission of 
Culbertson's objections effectively denied the objections. 
Second, in the instant case, the objection was disposed of, 
either expressly or by necessary implication. Culbertson's 
objection was submitted four days prior to the entry of judgment. 
The Board's own notice of submission of the order alerted the 
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trial court to the exact nature of Culbertson's objection. The 
trial court signed and entered the order in light of Culbertson's 
objection and the Board's explanation as to why Culbertson 
refused to approve the order as to form. 
Third, Culbertson's "objection" cannot constitute a Rule 
52(b) motion under Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1991). In Neerinas. the Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
purpose of Rule 52(b) motions are "to permit the filing of 
motions for amendment or making additional findings of fact, 
which, pursuant to Rule 52(a), are not required in ruling upon 
motions for summary judgment." Jd. at 322. Because no 
additional findings of fact can be required in a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment, Culbertson cannot claim her objection 
was a Rule 52(b) motion. Therefore, Zions is inapplicable 
because Culbertson's objection cannot, under Neerinas. be 
construed as Rule 52(b) motion. Under DeBry, Culbertson cannot 
claim her objection was a post-judgment motion, having been 
submitted prior to the entry of judgment. 
This Court refused to find that objections submitted prior 
to the entry of judgment suspended the finality of the judgment 
in Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert, 
denied 875 P.2d 563 (Utah 1994) . The Court stated in part that: 
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defendant argues that, the summary judgment 
was not a final order because her objections 
. thereto were not: expressly ruled upon. 
Defendant submitted timely objections to 
plaintiff's proposed order under Rule 4-
504(2) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, which provides that such 
objections be submitted within five days 
after service of the proposed order. After 
the five-day period had expired, the trial 
court signed plaintiff's proposed order 
without expressly ruling on defendant's 
objections, The objections were before the 
trial court; therefore, we believe the court 
implicitly denied plaintiff's objections. In 
any event, "the time for filing [a] notice of 
appeal begins to run when the judgment is 
entered . . ." 
Id. •?.*- C.CA ~ "• 'citations omitted) . 
Sirn; i e * - • - • • : ' • •*.;: ' • . e 
objections which were either implicitly or explicitly denied by 
the tr ial court. Despite Culbertson's written objections that 
claims relating to the vacation ordinance were met properly 
dismissed with prejudice, the trial court proceeded to dismiss 
the c] ai ins w:i tl 1 pre ji idice based, :i i i pai: L , « : i i the representations 
of Culbertson's attorney. The trial court's order resolved the 
objections and the oi: der was final. 
The subsequent actions of the ti; :i a 1 coi u: t: cons:i deri rig tl HE ; 
objection did iee have the effect of suspending the finality of 
the ji ldgme : ^1 court, on May 1 8, 1 995, issued a minute 
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entry denying Culbertson's objection and reaffirmed the trial 
court's intent that claims relating to the vacation ordinance 
were dismissed with prejudice. (R. 652). On August 28, 1995 the 
trial court held a hearing on Culbertson's objection1. (R. 854-
858). At the hearing, the trial court directed the Board's 
attorney to prepare an Order denying the objections but stated: 
"Any the issue, as to timeliness, they can take that up with the 
appellate courts." (R. 857). Therefore, the trial court went 
out of his way to indicate that he was not ruling on the 
timeliness of the notice of appeal or whether a notice should 
have been filed after the April 14, 1995 Order. 
On September 26, 1995 the trial court entered a written 
order denying Culbertson's objections to the April 14, 1995 
Order. (R. 701-702). The next day Culbertson filed a notice of 
appeal, nearly five months after entry of the final Order. (R. 
706-708). 
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal 
because Culbertson failed to file a timely notice of appeal. 
Culbertson's objection was submitted prior to the entry of the 
1
 At that hearing, Ms. Meibos represented herself. Mr. 
Olsen had withdrawn as counsel for all the parties. Therefore, 
the other plaintiffs were unrepresented at that hearing. 
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April 14, 1995 order. The objections were, therefore, not post-
judgment motions which tolled the thirty day time limit under 
Full' J nt iliM III ili ihules ol Appe I I at e Procedure. 
Culbertson's objection is properly characterized as an 
objection pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial 
Admin :i strati on i i : -t a s a ]:: c ist judgmei it moti oi i pur suant: Rule 52 (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Case law construing post-
judgment "objections" as post-judgment motions are not 
applicable. For instance/ in DeBry v Fidel ity Nat Ti11e Ins. 
Co. , 828 P. 2d 52J, 522-523 ("tar. C\ . Apr )2) the Court stated 
t • .. . ,L \, ,\, R motion filed wi thin 
ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness 
of the court's findings and conclusions in properly treated as a 
post j I ldgment moti on i mder ed thei Ri J '. ) or 
However, this :i s not a case where a party inadvertently 
submitted objections after the entry of judgment. Culbertson's 
after-the-fact characterization of the objections submitted prioi 
to the entry of judgment would convert every objection into a 
R/i i] e 52 (b) mot i : >i i T l i :i s i n t i in I woi il d • : T eate uncertainty and 
confusion surrounding the finality of judgments and orders. 
At oral argument, Ms. Meibos, one of the named parties 
conceded that: uwe ' * n 
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April 14th was the first week of May, we called the court and 
they said, yes, you had signed the order." (R. 856). In 
addition, "a party to lawsuit is on constructive notice of the 
contents of the court record and has a duty to be aware of what 
the trial court does." Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1077 
n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Finally, Culbertson was represented 
by counsel during the entire thirty day period and beyond. 
Counsel withdrew on July 3, 1995 (R. 654) well after the thirty 
day time period had passed. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
Culbertson was confused because she was a lay person untrained in 
the nuances of post-judgment motion practice2. 
There is no policy or legal rationale for treating 
objections submitted prior to the entry of judgment the same as 
post-judgment motions. Motions and objections serve separate and 
distinct purposes under the Rules of Civil Procedure and Code of 
Judicial Administration. Objections are submitted prior to the 
trial court's receipt of the proposed order under Rule 4-504. No 
provision is made for hearings on objections to proposed orders 
2
 In fact, Ms. Meibos sent a notice of appeal to the 
Board's attorney on May 14, 1995 (R. 673-675) and apparently 
decided not to file that particular notice of appeal. (R. 856). 
No notice of appeal appears in the court record in or around May 
14, 1995. 
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under Rule 4-504 . Conversely, specific provisi ons are set fox: th 
under Rule 4-501(3) for hearing motions. While objections 
j riadv ertei it 1 } serv ed af te i the entry o t j udgment may be construed 
as a post-judgment motion 3, there is no reason to construe 
objections submitted prior to the entry of judgment as a post: 
ji idgment mot d oi i • :: -i : a Ri i] e 52 (b) mot: on 
The record shows that Uj the objections were submitted four 
days before entry of judgment- '°^ the objections were submitted 
as objections, not as a Rule? " . - inrjqmeTit nn I - , .m I i ) 
that the plain language of the trial court's order In effect 
disposed : f the :: bj ec: ti oi is t\ i i or t riese f actors indicate that 
the April 14, 1995 Order was a final order. Therefore, 
Culbertson did not fi ] e a timely notice of appeal and this appeal 
s hoi ] ] :i b e d :ii s m :i s s e d f : • :i : ] a L : 1 :: : • f s i ] b j e c t ma t: t e i: j u i i s d i c t i on. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED CLAIMS RELATING TO THE 
VACATION ORDINANCE BASED ON THE IN COURT WAIVER, ABANDONMENT 
AND/OR ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ROAD VACATION CLAIMS BY CULBERTSON'S 
ATTORNEY. 
In its Apri ] ] 4, 1 995 Or der, the trial court stated: 
plaintiffs7 claims as contained within 
plaintiffs7 second amended complaint, 
3
 See DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 
52 2 52 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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relating to that certain Salt Lake County 
Ordinance as passed by the Board of Salt Lake 
County Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance 
number 1275 (corrected). dated August 10, 
1995, in the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office, be and the same are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice . . . 
(R. 648)(emphasis added). 
Culbertson's challenge to the trial court's ruling fails to 
identify the clearest and most obvious basis for the Order; 
namely, Culbertson's attorney's open court waiver, abandonment 
and acquiescence. Culbertson's attorney's waiver renders Point 
III in her brief moot. When faced with the argument at oral 
argument in the trial court, Culbertson's attorney elected to 
waive and abandon the claims rather than address the arguments 
posed by the Board. Having made that election, Culbertson may 
not now retreat from her position as stated by her attorney. 
A client is bound by the statements of her attorney. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2) (1996) provides that an attorney has 
authority uto bind his client in any of the steps of an action or 
proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or entered upon 
the minutes of the court, and not otherwise." See also John 
Deere Co. v. H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 886 n. 11 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) and In Re Cargill. Inc.. 66 F.3d 1256, 1261 (1st Cir. 
1995)("it is common ground that civil litigants are bound by 
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their attorney's tactical "judgments . . . -; r- \?> 
silence are standard fare ' ) Culbertscr. \3 bound i?y :::ie in 
court "abandonment and/or acquiescence o. ;ier attorney on 
all claims relating uo the vacation ordinance. 
Abandonment is iefined as "the intentional, unequivocal 
rel i i iqu :i shment of -^-iief d t: di le f i : n: t a notl ie:i : " Anderson v. 
Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 95, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Waiver is 
defined as "the d ntentional relinquishment of a known right: " 
Barnes v. Wood, 5 50 ] 226 1 230 (Utah 2i P. j: j: » 1 988 ) . 
Culbertson/s attorney waived all claims relating to the 
vacati on oi: dinance at the ora] argument on t-he motion for leave 
to file an amended complaint on January '• = •, J.995 and thereafter 
at oral argument on March 29, 1995, '?• 818-845* In the 
J a n i i r i i y < n , i u u i he-Mi i I ' M , " "i i 11 -o t 1 :i> »n j ; < i l t » ' . i n o y niad< t h e 
following statements in open court; 
The reason we are here before you today, your 
Honor, is not to attack the ordinance. While 
the original complaint may have those 
allegations i n it, your Honor, it is a mess 
out there. And what w€^  are here today is 
asking the county to enforce its own 
ordinance. If you look at the amended 
complaint, basically paragraph 33 on, you 
will see that we are not attacking -- we are 
not attacking that ordinance in the amended 
complaint, 
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Later the trial court stated: 
I'm going to allow you to amend if you so 
choose . . . But it will only be as to 
injunctive relief -- I guess not injunctive -
- I guess it is injunctive relief you're 
asking me on one hand part of that where a 
suit to force the county to do something, 
i.e. to enforce their own ordinances, right? 
MR. M. OLSEN: Right. 
(R. 842) 
At that point, Mr. Nick J. Colessides, the attorney then 
representing the Board, requested the following clarification 
from the trial court: 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, clarification for 
just one moment. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, as we have viewed 
these, this is sort -- we are dealing with a 
moving target. As I see the second amended 
complaint they are going to be filing another 
version of it and wherein, as I understand 
it, they do not seek to invalidate the 
ordinance, am I correct? 
THE COURT: That's what was represented. 
MR. COLESSIDES: And that issue is dead. 
THE COURT: Plus I have told them they would 
amend to not include damages and so only as 
to the injunctive relief as to have the 
county enforce its own ordinance, that will 
be the limitation on the amendments. 
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(R. 843) . 
Later, at the hearing on the Board's motion for summary 
;iudqnienl .. Mdt-1„ 1l" l l l u l ', I- ' . l^ lj/>I) t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d a s 
f o l l o w s : 
I'm, going to dismiss this matter - • 
without prejudice -- without prejudice, that 
is emphasized -- allowing you to exhaust 
whatever means you wish to, your 
administrative remedies, and then have leave, 
if after that time there has been no 
resolution to your satisfaction, through the 
-- through Mr. Jones, through the board of 
planning the Planning Commission, through 
the Board of County Commissioners and the 
Board of Adjustment, then you do have leave, 
without prejudice to refile the matter. 
It is my inciication from listening to you, 
Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that 
it is a continuing problem and that there 
will be no waiver of time, and. your position 
taken before me today, and I expect no 
contrary position be taken :in further 
litigation --
MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the 
exception of the vacation ordinance. 
THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is -.-
subject to a previous order that I made. 
(U "^1^92 A) 
Culbertson's attorney, by his affirmative representation;.:. I n 
the trial court, waived and abandoned claims relating to the 
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vacation ordinance at the hearing on January 30, 19954. 
Culbertson's attorney affirmatively indicated that the reason he 
was in court was not to attack the vacation ordinance. (R. 840). 
Counsel again affirmatively assented to the trial court's 
description of his suit as only seeking to enforce the ordinance 
through injunctive relief. (R. 840). Later, when Mr. 
Colessides sought clarification, Culbertson's attorney was 
present. Mr. Colessides specifically asked whether they were 
going to attack the vacation ordinance and the trial court stated 
"That's what was represented." (R. 843). Mr. Colessides then 
stated that the issue is dead and the trial court agreed. (R. 
4
 Although Culbertson's attorney submitted, and the trial 
court signed, an Order On Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint 
which did not contain the limitations clearly stated by the trial 
court and accepted by Culbertson (R. 294-295), the Board in its 
first responsive pleading asserted waiver and/or estoppel as 
defenses. (R. 320,321). The Board then moved for the dismissal 
of the road vacation claims improperly submitted based on 
Culbertson's attorney's waiver of these claims. (R. 343)("in 
view of the fact that the condition precedent to the filing of 
the second amended complaint as ordered by the Court, was the 
waiver by plaintiff of their claims relating to the validity and 
passage of the Vacation Ordinance . . . " ) . See also (R. 
603)(discussing counsel's statements at January 30, 1995 
hearing). The record shows that the trial court had the 
transcripts of the January 30, 1995 hearing at the time it 
considered the parties' position on March 29, 1995. (R. 
818)(indicating transcript filed on March 27, 1995). Therefore, 
the Board properly and timely raised the issue of waiver opposing 
Culbertson's assertion of claims relating to the vacation 
ordinance. 
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843) . ouring this entire exchange, Culbertson's attorney 1 ::y 
remaining silent acquiesced .;• -he characterization of his claims 
b;y both opposi ng coi n ise] a. • r -• tr i a 1 rourt. 
Culbertson's attorney was also present during the Mar •• 
1995 hearing and did not object or indicate that the criai vcur: 
erred i in :i ts i: <• ••*co 1 1 e e I i o n i • > I" t: h.e st:a11 is c f 11 Ie c3 ai i: ns re 1 ating to 
the vacation ordinance. The failure of Culbertson's attorney to 
object or in any wa^r iissent shows that he waived, abandoned 
and/or acquiesced to uir v :irnj s s a l o f * • I «-a i nr: i L e l d t n i g t t In m a d 
vacation ordinance. Culbertson is bound by the conduct of her 
attorney i "u ibei tson ' :; attorney's conduct is similar to the 
conduct considered in Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 90 9 P.2d 
271, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) cert, granted 920 P.2d 1194(1996) 
w r v - ^ - . • ' r m -k:-r-- ii • •:'•: ; - •. - •;:ia : it ..J- L .J 
a trial court,'> ararr of additional peremptory challenges to a 
defendant' , The Court stated: 
Rightly or wrongly, counsel conceded that 
Pleasant Grove had different interests than 
Smith and Pro-Tech and did not continue to 
press his argument as it pertained to 
Pleasant Grove. Therefore, because plaintiff 
ultimately waived her objection to the trial 
court's decision granting Pleasant Grove an 
additional set of peremptory challenges, we 
will not a.low her to contest it on appeal. 
Id. at 2 75 
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The trial court properly entered an Order dismissing claims 
relating to the vacation ordinance with prejudice based on 
Culbertson7s attorney's open court waiver, abandonment and 
acquiescence to the dismissal of such claims. 
POINT III 
THE BOARD DID PROPERLY AND TIMELY PLEAD BOTH WAIVER AND STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
Culbertson7s first point that the Board waived, by failing 
to plead both waiver and statute of limitations, is inconsistent 
with the record and is without merit. Culbertson contends the 
Board failed to raise the defense of waiver and statute of 
limitations. First, the Board affirmatively asserted the defense 
of waiver and estoppel in its answer to Culbertson7s second 
amended complaint. (R. 320). Therefore, the Board did raise the 
defense of waiver in a timely fashion and Culbertson's waiver of 
all claims relating to the vacation ordinance was properly 
considered by the trial court. 
Second, the Board did plead the affirmative defense of 
statute of limitations in alleging Culbertson7s failure to comply 
with Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (1995) in its answer to 
Culbertson7s second amended complaint. The Answer specifically 
stated: "As a further affirmative defense defendants assert that 
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plaintiffs' attack upon the passage of the vacation ordinance i <•; 
time barred, a_ more particularly provided for by § 17-27-1001 
Utai i ::ode An not at e< I, I! 9 9 :i Replacemei it: j J (1 ! : 1 t ) Because 
Culbertson's first amended complaint was, if anything, premature, 
the Board's first answer did not raise the statute of 
1 i iiii t a t i o n s I ii 1 l e i l t l i = i :i i ltd i nel i n e s s : 'f Ci i l b e r t s o i l s a t t a c k :::o: I t l le 
vacation ordinance became an issue,, the Board raised the defense 
in a timely fashion Ev en before the filing of the amended 
complaint, the Board raised the :i ssi le of noi i comp] i a nee w i tl i 
U.C.A. § 17 27 1 00] (1995) i n writino in ::.- memorandum opposing 
the j:>] roposed an: lei ided comp] a :i i it, ) . 
In addition, the Board raised Culbertson's waiver of her 
vacation ordinance claims in its memorandum in support of its 
motion for iudcirnent MM the p I oaci i ngi-'i m in I lu-j d I t~e'j native f<..»r 
summary judgment, (R, 330; 343). Therefore, this issue was 
presented to the tri a ] court properly and Culbertson was given 
the opportunity to respond to the argument LiidL ner *"-
waived claims relatir.:{ to the vacation ordinance - .In r.acr: 
Cw 1 b ^ i t " s o n r f-\spi mi i^ -'u i n .«tguii iei) i I II li<~"i 'u* 'in* n dt i ' luin i n 
opposition. (:- 4 5 4 54) - rherefoie, Culbertson cannot now 
claim, she did :± : ha^ro notice of either the waiver cr statute ::f 
limitation argu- ^ r r • • • • - . • . •.. . p ; ... • .. 
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to respond to the argument. The record shows that both 
arguments were presented to the trial court in writing and that 
oral argument was received on both issues. The manner in which 
both of these issues were considered comported with fundamental 
notions of due process. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 52 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court's April 15, 1995 
Order did not comply with U.R.C.P. 52(a) by failing to issue a 
statement of grounds for its decision, such failure is not 
reversible error. See Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 
P.2d 949, 958 n. 4 (Utah 1992) ("failure to issue a statement of 
grounds is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances . . 
. " ) . The alleged failure to comply with Rule 52 is not 
reversible error in light of the fact that the record provides a 
clear and legally sufficient basis upon which to base the trial 
court's ruling, i.e. the waiver, abandonment and/or acquiescence 
of Culbertson's attorney. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "on review . . . 
[the appellate courts] are not limited to written findings, and 
may properly examine findings expressed solely from the bench or 
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contained in other court documents, such as court memoranda." 
Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The transcripts of the hearings combined with the memoranda 
submitted to the trial court provide a clear and proper basis for 
the dismissal of the claims relating to the road vacation 
ordinance. Accordingly, the Board requests that the trial 
court's order be affirmed. 
Culbertson argues that this Court may simply strike the 
vacation ordinance based on arguments not not presented to the 
trial court for consideration. Culbertson relies on Masters v. 
Woosley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). First, Masters does 
not stand for the proposition that failure to comply with Rule 
52(a) is "normally reversible error." Instead, the court noted 
that uin an appropriate case, failure to do so may justify remand 
to the trial court." id. at 501. In fact, the general rules in 
Utah is that non compliance with Rule 52 (a) is not reversible 
error. See Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 958 
n. 4 (Utah 1992). Further, the plaintiff in Masters only sought 
to challenge the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and did 
not seek to obtain a ruling against the opposing party for the 
first time on appeal. Culbertson did not move for summary 
judgment or judgment on the pleadings below. Because Culbertson 
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did not move for summary judgment on the validity of the vacation 
ordinance, the trial court did not rule on it. See Ong 
International v. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 n. 31 (Utah 
1993)("Our concern is whether an argument was addressed in the 
first instance to the trial court.") Therefore, Culbertson may 
not now move to invalidate the vacation ordinance on appeal. 
POINT V 
THE ORDER CAN BE UPHELD UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF INVITED ERROR. 
Assuming arguendo the Order entered by the trial court was 
in error, it was invited error on the part of Culbertson and 
therefore is not properly subject to attack by Culbertson. This 
Court has stated that xx [a] party who leads a court into error 
cannot later complain of that error to obtain reversal." Merriam 
v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See 
also Butler Crockett v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 235 
(Utah 1995)(applying invited error doctrine based on statement of 
counsel in open court) and Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products 
Co.. 137 P.2d 347, 354 (Utah 1943) ("A party who takes a position 
which either leads a court into error or by conduct approves the 
error committed by the court, cannot later take advantage of such 
error. . . . " ) . 
The statements and later silence of Culbertson's attorney 
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led the trial court into entering the ruling that claims relating 
to the vacation ordinance were dismissed with prejudice. 
Culbertson's attorney had the opportunity to object to the trial 
court's interpretation of his statements or to clarify them at 
either the January 30, 1995 or March 29, 1995 hearing but chose 
not to do so. Accordingly, Culbertson may not now attack the 
Order which was entered based on Culbertson's attorney's 
representations to the trial court. 
POINT VI 
CULBERTSON'S CHALLENGES TO THE VACATION ORDINANCE ARE NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Culbertson raises several arguments challenging the validity 
of the vacation ordinance on appeal. First, such claims have 
been waived and abandoned by Culbertson in the trial court. 
Second, affirmative attacks on the vacation ordinance are not 
properly before this Court. 
Culbertson argues that the vacation ordinances (1270 and 
1275) are invalid because of the Board's alleged failure to 
comply with U.C.A. § 17-27-810(1)(a). This argument is raised 
for the first time on appeal and is therefore not properly before 
this Court. See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 
1985)("where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground . . 
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. in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that 
ground on appeal.") and John Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, Inc.. 
876 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Culbertson did not 
challenge at the trial court the vacation ordinance based on the 
Board's alleged non-compliance with section 810(1) (a). Neither 
did Culbertson submit a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking 
to declare the ordinance invalid. Therefore, Culbertson may only 
appeal the trial court's dismissal of her claims with prejudice 
and may not, in effect, seek summary judgment for the first time 
on appeal. 
In addition, Culbertson failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(5) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which requires a 
citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved or in 
the alternative a statement of the grounds for seeking review if 
the issue was not properly preserved by the trial court. See 
Culbertson Brief, pages 1-2. 
Culbertson's conduct in representing to the trial court 
through counsel that the vacation ordinance would not be 
challenged precluded the Board from presenting arguments in 
support of the vacation ordinance. See Turtle Management, Inc. 
v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)(despite the 
fact that issue raised in pleading xx[t]his Court will not 
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consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial 
court and concerning which the trial court did not have the 
opportunity to make any finding of fact or law.") Because 
Culbertson waived and abandoned claims relating to the vacation 
ordinance, the Board did not persist in presenting arguments to 
the trial court in support of its validity. 
Such arguments would include the fact that the alleged 
failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-810(1) (a) (1995) 
does not affect the validity of the Board's actions. Utah 
appellate courts have consistently held that time limitations on 
governmental actions are directory and not jurisdictional uif it 
is 'given with a view merely to the proper orderly and prompt 
conduct of business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will 
occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Cache 
County v. Property Tax Division, 296 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah 
1996)(citing 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 25.03 (4th 
Ed.)). In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 
705 (Utah 1978) the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether 
statutory provisions "regarding the time period in which the 
board of county commissioners must perform its statutory duty in 
levying a property tax, are directory or mandatory." The court 
reiterated the general rule as set forth in the early case of 
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State ex rel. Wright v. Park City School District, 133 P. 128, 
129, 43 Utah 61, 66 (1913): 
The general rule is that a statute, 
prescribing the time within which public 
officials are required to perform an official 
act, is directory only, unless it contains 
negative words denying the exercise of the 
power after the time specified or the nature 
of the act to be performed, or the language 
used by the Legislature shows that the 
designation of time was intended as a 
limitation . . . . 
Under the above-cited case law, any failure to comply with 
17-27-810 (1995) by the Board does not invalidate the ordinance. 
Case law cited by Culbertson from the area of redevelopment law 
is inapplicable. The vacation of a public road is not in 
derogation of an individual's property rights. The strict rule 
of statutory construction in the area of redevelopment law arises 
from the use of condemnation procedures against landowners. 
Here, the Board did not initiate condemnation proceedings against 
Culbertson. 
The trial court also did not address the propriety of the 
notice provided due to Culbertson7s waiver and abandonment of her 
challenge to the vacation ordinance5. However, Culbertson7s 
5
 Culbertson did challenge the propriety of the notice in 
her amended complaint but did not present the argument to the 
trial court by way of summary judgment motion. Culbertson did 
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claim that she did not receive adequate notice is not supported 
by case law or the record. Culbertson relies on Nelson v. Provo 
City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) which is distinguishable. 
In Nelson, the "City mailed no notice of the vacation to the 
abutting landowners either before or after the fact." id. at 36. 
Not surprisingly, the Court held: 
Here, City did not notify abutting 
landowners, nor did it notify its citizens 
generally pursuant to statute. In fact, the 
single published notice ran after the 
purported vacation. Thus, City's notice was 
not only insufficient, it was timely. 
Id. at 38. 
Conversely, the Board properly sent and published notice of 
the proposed vacation. (R. 352-353). In fact, Culbertson's 
attorney was present and participated in the hearing considering 
the proposed vacation. (R. 359-360). Utah's statutory scheme 
regarding land use decisions only require notice of the public 
hearing to consider the proposed vacation. The Board complied 
with these notice requirements codified in U.C.A. § 17-27-808 & 
809 (1995). In addition, the Board complied with the notice 
suggest in her memorandum opposing summary judgment that she did 
not receive notice of the August 10, 1995 decision. However, she 
did not move to invalidate the ordinance on that basis. 
Therefore, the argument is in effect, raised for the first time 
on appeal. 
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requirements generally applicable to ordinances. See U.C.A. § 
17-15-1 (1995). 
The final improper challenge to the vacation ordinance is 
that the trial court improperly shifted responsibility for 
complying with the applicable statutory requirements. The trial 
court did no such thing. The trial court dismissed Culbertson's 
claims relating to the vacation ordinance based on her attorney's 
own statements. As for the notice requirements, the Board 
complied with the notice requirements set forth in U.C.A. § 17-
17-808 & 809 (1995) as well as U.C.A. § 17-15-1 (1995). 
This appeal is an improper attempt to revisit an issue 
abandoned long ago. To allow Culbertson to pursue an attack on 
the road vacation ordinance would unfairly prejudice the Board. 
The Board had a right to rely on the in court representations of 
Culbertson7s attorney. Culbertson should not now be allowed to 
back out on statements made in court to both to the Board's 
attorney and the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this 
appeal. Culbertson failed to file a timely notice of appeal. 
Further, the objections submitted prior to entry of order do not 
constitute a proper post-judgment motion which tolls the thirty 
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day limit on filing notice of appeals. The Board requests that 
Culbertson's appeal be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 
The trial court correctly dismissed claims relating to the 
road vacation ordinance with prejudice based on Culbertson's 
counsel's in court waiver and abandonment of such claims. In the 
alternative, the doctrine of invited error applies to sustain the 
order. Culbertson's attacks on the vacation ordinance are not 
properly before the Court. Therefore, the Board requests that 
the trial court's order be affirmed and Culbertson's appeal 
dismissed. 
Finally, the Board joins in and incorporates by reference 
the arguments made by Commissioners Overson and Horiuchi relating 
to the vacation ordinance and the trial court's dismissal of 
claims relating to the ordinance as well as the arguments 
relating to Culbertson's untimely notice of appeal. 
DATED this }Lu day of February, 1997. 
DOUGLAS R. SHORT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Patrick F. Holden 
Deputy County Attorney 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /Q£ day of February, 1997 I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS postage pre-paid, first class mail, 
to the following: 
Walter F. Bugden 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON 
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Chris R. Hogle 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Diane Pearl Meibos 
3278 Marjon Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84092-4212 
44 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 4 
ght appeal as matter of right. Jensen v. 
, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). 
^denying a motion for summary judg-
} not a final order and was not appeal-
v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 
g2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 
r judgment in favor of one defen-
ftone is not a final judgment where the 
-against the remaining defendant re-
~ Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d 
JUtah 1983). 
minute entry. 
[jjnsigned minute entry did not constitute 
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State 
Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 
(Utah 1986). 
An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
tute a final order for purposes of appeal State 
v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
(Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
. — Appealability of order suspending 
sition or execution of sentence, 51 
L4th 939. 
le 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
$) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
emitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
tice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
"" ; within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
[ be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
of the judgment or order appealed from. 
t>) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
les of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
lgs of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
lent; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
ies shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
^denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Jteh Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
ler Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
nt, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
^parties shall nm from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
gig or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
p&position of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
pie order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
^ (c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
fiaragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
jtoe trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
* (d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
Pa which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
^escribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. -
^ (e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
open motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
^scribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other narties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative actions. 
Attorney fees. 
Cross-appeaL 
Extension of time to appeal. 
—Amendment or modification of judgment. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Premature notice. 
Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative actions. 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for 
review of administrative actions. Mavenk 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Cross-appeaL 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
an appeal simply by filing a Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Proper remedy of defendant whose cross-ap-
peal was not timely filed under Subdivision (d), 
upon having the notice returned, was to file a 
motion to extend time with the district court 
under Subdivision (e); the appellate court could 
not consider such a motion, or grant an exten-
sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
—Amendment or modification of judg. 
ment. 
If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judg. 
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App; 
1994). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there waa 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to aopel-
lant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order ;>r judgment. 
Where the tnai court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. State, In re 
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first signed order denying the motion 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's 
counsel to prepare an order showing that plain-
tiffs post-judgment motions filed pursuant tc 
Rules 52(b) and 59, U.R.C.P., were denied was 
not a final appealable order. Swenson Assocs 
Architects v. State, 254 Utah Adv. Rep. S 
(Utah 1994). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timelj 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, bu1 
before the disposition of the motion, the motior 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, anc 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re-
quired time from the date of the entry thai 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 65£ 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
The time for appeal of an order confirming 
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-to prove permanence of injuries and to or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
' ^ instructions to jury thereon, 18 rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
£1*170. Construction of statutes or rules making 
,riety and effect, in eminent domain pro- mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
tt of instruction to the jury as to land- P1™*1 ^ inact ions , 49 AX.R.3d 128. 
^ w i l l i n g n e s s to sell property, 20
 + Necessity'and propriety^of instructing onal-
*1081 temative theories of negligence or breach of 7.1 1~ ;„«+~,^™, ;„ ^™i ~<™ warranty, where instruction on strict liability Bet-urging mstructions in cml case
 d u c t 8 l i a b m 5 2 
jig desirability and importance of agree- ^ ^ £ o a 101 
rS8 A.L.R3d 1281. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
lict-urging instructions in civil case tion and effect of provision m Rule 51, ajid aim-
ing on weight of majority view or au- tfar gtate rules, that counsel be given opportu-
compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. nity to make objections to instructions out of 
licfc-urging instructions in civil case ad- hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
I jurors to refrain from intransigence Key Numbers. — Trial *=» 182 to 296. 
le 52. Findings by the court. 
Effect* In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
;6ry jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
lusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
i; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
' set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
Shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
Igphe opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fket and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
fiSSrt shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
lecision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment* Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion i^ay be made with 
amotion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Child custody. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
Adoption. —Denial of motion. 
—Abandonment of contract. —Divorce decree modifications. 
—-Advisory verdict. —Easement. 
—Breach of contract. —Evidentiary disputes. 
